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Abstract
Despite their relatively short history, deposit insurance schemes (DISs) are currently a common
element of the banking system. In 2004, 83 explicite DISs operated around the world. 
The Bank Guarantee Fund (Bankowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny – BFG) – the Polish institution
guaranteeing household deposits – is celebrating its 10th anniversary this year. Over its 10 years of
active operation the BFG has proved that, along with the National Bank of Poland and the
Commission for Banking Supervision, it is among the most important institutions protecting the
Polish financial system from destabilisation. 
The introductory part of this paper presents the position of the Bank Guarantee Fund within
the Polish financial safety net. Other guarantee schemes operating in the Polish financial services
sector have also been presented. Moreover, the paper explains the reasons for the launching of a
DIS and points out the purposes for the establishment of the BFG. Further, it describes the evolution
of Polish deposit guarantee arrangements since 1982. Special emphasis has also been put on the
analysis of Bank Guarantee Fund administration.
The main aim of this paper is to describe Polish deposit insurance scheme. Particular features
of the Polish scheme are discussed with reference to the Community regulations in this field and
also arrangements adopted in the remaining 24 countries of the European Union. 
The third chapter of this paper describes the fundamental area of the Fund’s activity, i.e.
guarantee activities consisting in making compensation payouts to depositors in the event of a
bank’s bankruptcy. The scope of coverage (eligible types of deposits and depositors) offered by the
Polish scheme has been analysed. The scope of the BFG’s guarantee activities from 1995 to 2004
has also been presented.
In the fourth chapter, the BFG’s activities aimed at minimising risk in the banking sector have
been presented. The principles and experience of the Fund regarding financial support for the
rehabilitation of banks threatened with insolvency have been discussed in greatest detail here.
The fifth chapter describes the principles and procedures regarding the financing of
guarantee and assistance activities of the Bank Guarantee Fund. 
In the summary, the paper indicates possible directions for changes in the BFG legislation. It
has been pointed out that despite the fact that Polish regulations comply with EU requirements,
they must be adjusted to suit the changing domestic conditions. 
JEL classification: G21, G28, G29, G33
Keywords: deposit insurance scheme, bank failure, assistance activities, Polish banking sector,
financial stability, financial safety net, central bank, banking supervision, Community regulations6
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BFG as an important element of the safety net
1.1 Polish financial safety net
Considered as a public good, stability of the financial system is in the interest of all
participants of political and economic life. However, market mechanisms sometimes fail to
guarantee this stability in all circumstances. This is the reason why in every country a set of
institutional and regulatory arrangements has been established, which aims to protect the financial
system from destabilisation – the financial safety net.1
The most important institutions constituting the Polish financial safety net include: 
1) The National Bank of Poland (Narodowy Bank Polski – NBP) – being a central bank, it
fulfils the role of the lender-of-last-resort, also referred to as Emergency Liquidity Assistance. The
role of the NBP consists in providing discretional liquidity supply to a single bank or the entire
banking system in response to an unfavourable shock leading to an extraordinary increase in
demand for reserve money, which cannot be met by other sources. 
2) The Commission for Banking Supervision (Komisja Nadzoru Bankowego – CBS) – as an
institution supervising the banking sector, it fulfils three basic functions: the licensing, regulatory,
and audit and administrative ones. It should be noted here that the General Inspectorate of Banking
Supervision, which is organizationally autonomous within the structure of the NBP since January 1,
1998, is the executive body of the CBS.
3) The Bank Guarantee Fund – being a deposit guarantee fund2 whose mission is to protect
deposits accumulated at the banks covered by the Polish scheme and to support the safety and
stability of the banking system in Poland.
The Ministry of Finance – the main institution regulating the financial system – little doubt,
also participates in the operation of the Polish safety net. Moreover, the government, which is
referred to as the “owner-of-last-resort,” may directly inject capital into a bank or the entire banking
system where a systemic crisis threatens. However, the government’s involvement in crisis
management is usually not formalised. Moreover, the Office for Competition and Consumer
Protection as well as payment systems and bankruptcy law procedures may be listed as institutions
and regulations forming the safety net.
With a view of ensuring efficient operation of the safety net construction, which protects the
financial system from destabilisation, all its parts must cooperate at particular crisis management
stages. The design of the Polish financial safety net also includes several links between the DIS and
its other elements. For example, a bilateral agreement between the BFG and the NBP, which pertains
primarily to the exchange of information between these institutions, has been in force since May 27,
19973. A closer cooperation between the Polish Fund and banking supervision authorities is ensured
by the fact that the President of the BFG Management Board is a member of the Commission for
Banking Supervision. The Ministry of Finance supervises the operation of the Fund, while annual
reports of the BFG are submitted for review to the Polish Parliament by the Council of Ministers.
1 More on this subject in: Szczepaƒska, Sotomska-Krzysztofik, Pawliszyn and Pawlikowski (2004).
2 According to Guidance for Developing Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (2001): Financial Stability Forum, a DIS is
an important component of the financial safety net. 
3 The agreement was amended on January 31, 2005.1
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It should be remembered, however, that financial stability is a much broader concept than banking
sector stability. This means that potential threats to the stability of the entire financial system may emerge
not only within the banking sector but within the insurance sector and the capital market as well. In
Poland, a sectoral supervision model has been implemented and thus the supervision authorities and
guarantee schemes operating in those sectors are also factors in financial stability (Table 1).
Table 1 
Position of the BFG in the Polish financial safety net
Position of the BFG in the Polish financial safety net
Source: own research.
The Bank Guarantee Fund, which has already been listed among the three most important
institutions of the Polish safety net, is also no doubt the most important guarantee institution. This
is corroborated by the fact that the scope of the BFG’s powers relates to the banking sector, which
is the key (albeit its position is steadily diminishing) component of the Polish financial sector.
Additionally, the banking services market is particularly prone to systemic risk due to the fact that
a crisis at one financial institution may spread to other market participants (contagion), which may
severely disrupt the operation of the entire system.
The other guarantee institutions operating within the Polish financial system are:
• The National Depository for Securities, which operates the following guarantee schemes4:
– Compulsory Investor Compensation Scheme, which ensures payouts to investors should a
brokerage house declare bankruptcy — 100% for amounts of up to 3,000 euro and 90%
for amounts from 3,000 euro to 11,000 euro5;
– Securities Settlement System which ensures proper performance of obligations arising from
transactions concluded in the regulated securities market;
– Pension Guarantee Fund, which protects the interests of open pension fund members.
• The Insurance Guarantee Fund, which settles claims arising from compulsory insurance
where the party which has caused damage is not insured or its identity cannot be determined
(protection of the insured party) as well as claims arising from compulsory insurance and life
insurance in the amount of 50% of the claim (not exceeding the equivalent of 30,000 euro) where
an insurance company declares bankruptcy, pursuant to certain principles.
4 See: Financial System Development In Poland 2002–2003, NBP, September 2004.
5 The projected evolution towards cover compliant with Directive 97/9/EC stipulated in the Law on the Public Trading of
Securities consists in raising the upper guarantee limit to 15,000 euro from January 1, 2006, to 19,000 euro from
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• The institutions operating the so-called Savings Protection Programme, i.e. the National
Association of Cooperative Savings and Credit Unions and the Mutual Insurance Company.
The aim of the Programme is to ensure safe operation of all cooperative savings and credit unions.
The Programme covers deposits received by them up to the equivalent to 22,500 euro6.
It should be emphasised that guarantee institutions which protect the interests of depositors
and investors in the capital market are common in European Union countries7. The establishment
of guarantee schemes covering customers of insurance companies is not a standard arrangements,
however. On the other hand, the example of Great Britain8 indicates that it is possible to abandon
the sectoral approach and create a joint guarantee institution covering customers of all financial
institutions. 
1.2. Purpose for establishment of the BFG
The need to limit the systemic risk caused by the phenomenon known as the bank run is
the most important premise for creation of a DIS worldwide. A mass withdrawal of deposits from
a single bank can trigger the domino effect and thus spread to other banks, causing a systemic
threat. Depositors are less prone to withdraw deposits en masse where they are aware that their
savings are covered by legal guarantees.
The protection of bank customers is also an important reason for the establishment of a
DIS. Due to the fact that depositors only have access to limited information about the institution to
which they entrust their savings, they encounter the information asymmetry problem. This is
because in practice complete information necessary in order to thoroughly evaluate the current
financial standing of a bank is not made publicly available9. The presence of banking supervision
institutions somewhat mitigates this market imperfection. In practice, however, retail bank
customers are unable to interpret the data and assess in a fully rational and correct manner the
trustworthiness of individual financial institutions operating on the market as well as compare all
their products on offer10.
The Bank Guarantee Fund was established primarily in order to adjust the Polish
arrangements to European Union requirements. The most important Community regulations in
this respect are included in Directive 94/19/EC of May 30, 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes. In
general, this directive harmonises only selected issues, leaving individual Member States certain
discretion in shaping their national regulations. As a consequence, DISs operating in particular
European Union countries exhibit significant differences. 
The  need to introduce systemic arrangements in place of provisional ones and thus
eliminate the discrepancies regarding deposit guarantees in banks operating in Poland was also an
important objective guiding the establishment of the Polish Fund. The model of regulations
regarding the DIS which had been in force in Poland before the BFG was established has been
described in the next chapter of this paper. The establishment of the Fund has also made it possible
to create systemic possibilities for extending financial support to banks which either become
insolvent or are threatened with insolvency. 
It should bekept in mind, however, that the existence of a DIS as an additional institution
protecting the financial system from destabilisation also entails certain costs apart from obvious
advantages. The presence of the financial safety net may lead to diminishing a market discipline
through the increased probability of moral hazard. Banks, which are aware of the potential
6 See: Jurkowska (2003).
7 This is a requirement of Directive 97/9/EC of March 3, 1997 on investor-compensation schemes.
8 The Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which was established in September 2001.
9 The Banking Act only requires banks to publish their balance sheets, together with the opinion of the certified auditor,
for the most recent period subject to audit, at their places of business (Art. 111, para. 1, item 5).
10 Cf. Zaleska (2002).1
BFG as an important element of the safety net
MATERIA¸Y I STUDIA – PAPER 34 9
1
LudnoÊç (1946-2001)
protection afforded by the institutions constituting the safety net, may take decisions which
maximise their profits and often involve greater risk. However, proper principles of designing a DIS,
which have also been adopted in the case of the BFG, make it possible to limit moral hazard. In
their paper, R. Gropp and J. Vesala11 present a slightly different approach to the relationship
between the existence of a DIS and the problem of moral hazard. Following their research
conducted on the basis of the experience of EU countries, they claim that a formalised DIS may be
a tool contributing to better monitoring of the banks’ standing and limiting moral hazard.
The main objective of this paper is to describe the Polish DIS as an important component of
the financial safety net operating in Poland. The regulations and procedures of operation of the
Bank Guarantee Fund will be presented with reference to EU regulations in this field and compared
to those of other guarantee institutions operating in the remaining European Union countries. The
comparative analysis covers 25 mandatory DISs operating in all EU countries; in the case of
Germany, the voluntary scheme has been also included due to its popularity. 
11 See: Gropp and Vesala (2004).10
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Characteristics of the Polish deposit insurance scheme
2.1. Year of establishment
The history of the Polish deposit guarantee regulations goes back to 1982 when the then
Banking Act stipulated that the Treasury was liable for bank liabilities arising from savings and
deposits of natural persons. The corresponding act from 1989 retained the liability of the Treasury
for savings held at state-owned banks and other banks which had been covered by this scheme
before the act came into force. However, along with the development of the two-tier banking
sector, many private banks and banks with mixed capital structure were established at that time,
which were not covered by any guarantees pursuant to those regulations. This distorted the
competition between banks because banks protected by the Treasury were privileged compared to
newly established banks12.
In such circumstances, a provisional guarantee of sorts was introduced in 1994. The
Resolution of the Parliament on Monetary Policy Guidelines for 1994 included a clause stating that
until appropriate legal acts were issued, the President of the NBP would guarantee 100% of
deposits from natural persons for amounts up to ECU 1,000 and 90% for amounts ranging from
ECU 1,000 to ECU 3,000. 
The Polish DIS only acquired its current structure after the passage of the Law on the Bank
Guarantee Fund of December 14, 1994, which came into force on February 17, 1995. The Fund
itself started to operate as a separate institution in April 1995, where its authorities were
constituted (the Fund Council met for the first time on April 7 and on April 19, the Fund
Management Board was appointed).
The first European DIS was established nearly 30 years earlier (in 1966) in Germany. It should
be noted that this was the initiative of the banking sector. In the 1970s, DISs were established in
Finland, Belgium, Spain, Austria, Great Britain and the Netherlands. As a result, only eight DISs
operated in current European Union countries in 1980 (Figure 1).
As regards the regulations of the European Communities concerning DISs, their history dates
back to the mid-1980s. In 1986, the European Commission issued Recommendation 87/63/EEC
including guidelines for Member States.13 The most important regulation was the requirement to
adopt DISs in the countries which had no such schemes in place. As a result of the aforementioned
Recommendation, DISs were established in next European countries. By 1992, such schemes were
adopted in Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. In 1993, the first guarantee
institution in Central and Eastern Europe – the Hungarian fund – was established.
The adoption in 1994 of the aforementioned Directive 94/19/EC of the European
Parliament and the Council of May 30, 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes was a
breakthrough in the evolution of the Community regulations on deposit protection. This document
has provided for the current level of harmonisation between the European DISs.
12 See: Baka (2005).
13 See: Obal (2004).2
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Source: own research.
The fundamental requirements of the directive include the following principles:
• each member state must establish a scheme which guarantees the depositors’ funds;
• membership in the DIS must be compulsory for all credit institutions which take deposits;
• the costs of financing the scheme should in principle be borne by scheme participants, i.e.
credit institutions;
• the level of coverage offered must not be lower than 20,000 euro;
• co-insurance must not exceed 10%;
• compensation must be paid within 3 months of the date on which the deposit becomes
unavailable14.
The adoption of the directive triggered another wave of DISs establishment. At that time, such
schemes were launched mainly in Central and Eastern European countries (including Poland). DISs are
currently in place in all European Union Member States – the last one was adopted in Malta in 2003.
2.2. Fund administration
Pursuant to the Law on the BFG, the Fund is a juridical person with its registered office in
Warsaw. Despite the statutory clause stating that the Fund is not a state legal person, doubts
remain regarding this issue15.
The Bank Guarantee Fund was established on the initiative of public authorities, i.e. in an
administrative procedure. The procedure of establishment of a scheme typically has a direct impact on
the way in which it is administrated. This was also the case of the Polish fund, which is managed both
by the representatives of both public institutions and banking sector. Thus its administration is of a
joint, public-private type. 10-year experience with the BFG indicates that the adopted composition of
the Fund Council is appropriate – the membership of representatives of various institutions ensures
proper representation and objective decision-making. Moreover, the joint administration of the DIS
offers numerous advantages compared to exclusively private or public administration16.
14 However, the Directive allows for two extensions of the payout period, neither of which shall exceed 3 months.
15 See: Dobaczewska (2000).
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The Fund Council and the Fund Management Board are main bodies of the BFG. The Fund
Council  comprises the chairman, who is appointed and removed by the Prime Minister on
recommendation agreed between the Minister of Finance and the President of the NBP, as well as
10 members appointed and removed by the President of the NBP (4), the Minister of Finance (3)
and the Polish Banking Association (3). The term of office of the Fund Council shall be four years.
The scope of the Council’s activities is relatively broad and includes i.a.:
• supervision over the the Management Board activities;
• appointing and removing the Management Board members;
• setting the annual rates of the banks’ contributions to the Guaranteed Deposit Protection
Fund;
• setting the amounts of the banks’ mandatory annual contributions to the assistance fund;
• stipulating annual plans of operations and financial plans of the Fund;
• stipulating the principles, form, terms and conditions and procedure of extending financial
support to banks and the principles and forms of enforcing the return of funds due to the
BFG in connection with such support.
The Fund is directly managed and represented by the Management Board, which consists
of 5 members, including the president and his deputy. The term of office of the Fund Management
Board shall be three years but its members may be removed by the Fund Council at any time.
The EU directive does not stipulate the manner in which the guarantee fund is to be
managed. Moreover, it does not even require that the scheme be managed by a separate
institution, as is the case in Poland. The DIS must be “officially recognised” in a given country. As a
result, there are significant differences regarding the administration of DISs. In the overwhelming
majority of European Union countries, separate institutions (guarantee funds) have been
established in order to manage the DIS. Exceptions include Cyprus, the Netherlands, Ireland and
Slovenia, where central banks assumed the responsibilities related to deposit guarantees as well as
Malta and Latvia, where the bodies responsible for the operation of the scheme operate within the
structures of supervisory institutions.
F Fi ig gu ur re e   2 2







20%With respect to the manner in which the authorities are appointed, the administration of a
guarantee institution may be of a public (fund authorities include only representatives of public
authorities), private (only bank representatives run the scheme) or joint type. In the EU, the joint
model which assumes that the representatives of both banks and public authorities participate in
the management of the guarantee fund, currently prevails – it has been adopted in 12 countries.
In 8 countries (the Netherlands, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and Great
Britain) the DIS is under public administration. In only 5 countries (Austria, Finland, France,
Luxembourg and Italy) the authorities of the DIS are appointed exclusively by the banking sector
(Figure 2).
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Scope of BFG coverage
3.1. Institutions covered by the scheme
Membership in the Polish DIS is compulsory for all domestic banks, i.e. those with registered
offices in the territory of Poland. It should be emphasised that this principle applies both to
commercial and cooperative banks. However, credit unions remain outside the BFG scheme. This
arrangement should be considered compliant with EU regulations, since Polish credit unions,
similarly as credit unions in other countries, lay outside the scope of the definition of credit
institutions. These institutions have been exempt from EU directives regulating credit institution
operations17.
Moreover, branches of foreign banks registered in non-EU countries are required to joint
the BFG scheme unless they participate in a scheme offering a limit of coverage equivalent to that
in force in Poland18. Pursuant to the spirit of the directive, the Polish DIS also covers deposits held
at foreign branches of Polish banks operating in EU countries. On the other hand, the Polish law
does not require the branches of Polish banks which operate in non-EU countries to participate in
the BFG scheme; until now, their participation has been voluntary. Branches of banks with
registered offices in EU countries19 operating in the territory of Poland may, pursuant to the
topping-up principle, participate in the BFG scheme in cases where a limit of coverage in such
countries is lower than in Poland (this regulation has not been applied yet).
Banks which fulfil the obligations arising from the mandatory DIS may also undertake (within
the framework of the statutory guarantee scheme) to extend their fund guarantee obligations
beyond the minimum stipulated in the regulations. The establishment of a contractual DIS and the
principles of its operation must be approved by the Fund Council (this has also not been
implemented as yet and remains a statutory clause).
The EU Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes stipulates fairly precise principles regarding
the banks’ participation in individual DISs. Pursuant to the Community legislation, a credit
institution is required to participate in a DIS in the country where it has its registered office.
Pursuant to the home country control principle, the DIS in the home country also covers foreign
branches of domestic banks operating in other EU countries. On the other hand, the topping-up
principle makes it possible for a foreign bank from an EU country operating in another EU country
to participate in the host country DIS on a voluntary basis in order to supplement the level and
scope of coverage. Appropriate bilateral agreements between the guarantee institutions of the
home and the host country are usually concluded to this purpose.
The directive does not lay down principles regarding participation of branches of foreign
banks from non-EU countries and branches of domestic banks operating outside the territory of the
EU in the scheme. Pursuant to the Community legislation, Member States may require full
participation from branches of foreign banks from non-EU countries where the DIS of the home
country is not equivalent to the scheme in the host country. Some countries (e.g. Italy) require full
17 Including e.g. the most important one — Directive 200/12/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business
of credit institutions.
18 Where such branches participate in a DIS offering a limit lower than the Polish one, their participation in the BFG is
of a supplementary character.
19 According to the terminology used in the Banking Act, these are credit institution branches.3
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participation in such circumstances, even if a DIS is in place in the home country. EU regulations
leave the issue of regulating the participation of branches of domestic banks operating in non-EU
countries to the Member States’ discretion.
While only one fund operates in the case of the Polish DIS, this does not always apply to the
schemes in place in other European Union countries. Although in most EU countries one fund was
established within the framework of a given DIS, in 5 countries (Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy and
Portugal)  separate sub-schemes covering various credit institution categories (e.g. public,
private, cooperative, savings, mortgage or agricultural banks) operate. 
Apart from the 25 compulsory DISs operating in all EU countries, there is one (German)
voluntary scheme. Due to its considerable popularity, this scheme has been additionally included
in comparative analyses in this paper.
3.2. Level of coverage
The level of coverage is a very important element of any DIS and thus it should be discussed
in detail. Currently, the guarantees offered by the Bank Guarantee Fund cover the following deposit
amounts:
• 100% of deposit value up to the equivalent of 1,000 euro;
• 90% of deposit value within the range from 1,000 euro to 22,500 euro.
Although the upper limits of covered amounts are expressed in euro, compensation for
depositors is not paid out in the European currency. Regardless of the currency of the deposit,
guaranteed amounts are paid out in zloty after the value of the foreign currency deposit has been
converted according to the exchange rate on the date of the bank’s bankruptcy.
The aforementioned amounts include funds held in accounts as of the date on which the
operations of the bank have been suspended together with accrued interest up to the date on
which the decision concerning the declaration of bankruptcy of the bank is issued. From that date
onwards, interest on the funds held at the bank is no longer accrued.
The amount of deposit covered by the BFG is determined according to the following
principles:
• the sum of funds deposited by one person in all accounts (e.g. time deposits, current
accounts, personal transaction accounts) at a given bank constitutes the basis for the
calculation of the compensation;
• the bank’s liabilities to a given depositor are summed up and then offset against their
liabilities to the bank.
Within the Polish DIS, the co-insurance, i.e. incomplete protection of depositors regarding
the part of the deposit in excess of 1,000 euro (but not exceeding 22,500 euro) has been adopted.
Within the aforementioned range, the BFG covers only 90% of deposit amount, while the depositor
bears the risk related to the loss of the remaining part, i.e. 10% of deposit amount. The
introduction of co-insurance necessitates a distinction between the level of coverage and the
maximum compensation paid (payout limit). In the DISs without co-insurance, these two amounts
are equal, while if co-insurance is present, the maximum compensation paid equals the level of
coverage less the co-insurance amount. As a result, the potential maximum amount of
compensation paid out in Poland is equivalent to 20,350 euro.
It should be noted that the level of coverage, which initially amounted to ECU 3,000 only,
was systematically raised in line with the gradual adjustment to European Union directive
requirements. The currently in force level of coverage offered by the Bank Guarantee Fund was
reached at the beginning of 2003. Table 2 presents the upper limits of guaranteed amounts in
particular years.16
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Table 2 
History of the level of coverage offered by the BFG
Source: Annual reports of the BFG.
The fact that the level of coverage is set at 22,500 euro does not mean, however, that the depositor
automatically loses the amount in excess of the limit should the bank in which they have deposited the
funds declare bankruptcy. In certain circumstances, it is possible to recover the part of the deposit which
is not covered by the BFG scheme. It constitutes the depositor’s claim on the bankruptcy estate of the bank
and may be recovered in the course of bankruptcy proceedings foreseeing reorganisation arrangement or
the liquidation of the estate of the bankrupt bank. The part of deposit which is not covered by BFG
guarantees may be recovered as a result of distribution of the estate of the bankrupt bank20, and where
the failed bank has been acquired by another bank, the new owner assumes its liabilities to customers.
The level of coverage in European Union countries has been harmonised by the regulations of
Directive 94/19/EC. Pursuant to its requirements, the level of coverage offered by individual schemes
must not be lower than 20,000 euro. It should be noted that the regulations of the directive are not
precise enough in this respect, i.e. it is not clear whether the amount of 20,000 euro pertains to the
level of coverage or to the amount of compensation received by the depositor (level of coverage less
co-insurance amount). The first interpretation has been adopted by two countries (Slovenia and Malta)
where the level of coverage has been set at 20,000 euro and additionally the co-insurance at 10%. As
a result, the maximum potential amount of compensation paid in these countries is 18,000 euro.
The figure below presents payout limits, i.e. the maximum amounts of compensation paid to
depositors offered by individual DISs in European Union countries.
As evidenced by the figure below, payout limits in most European Union countries have been
set at the minimum level or slightly higher than required by Directive 94/19/EC. The level of
coverage offered by the Bank Guarantee Fund (shown in yellow) is average and equal to the median
value for European Union countries.
Payout limits in Italy, France, Great Britain and Denmark (shown in brown), which are much
higher than 20,000 euro, deserve mention. Very high level of coverage is also offered by the
voluntary DIS in Germany, which covers deposits up to 30% of a bank’s own capital. The
complementary character of the German compulsory and voluntary schemes makes the combined
level of coverage offered by both practically unlimited21.
The opposite is true with regard to the level of coverage offered by the DISs operating in the
Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (shown in grey). The payout limits currently in force in
these countries are much below EU requirements. This is a consequence of the transitional periods
negotiated by these countries with regard to the level of coverage in force until the end of 2007.









20 Pursuant to the bankruptcy law, the BFG has an extremely privileged position with regard to the order of satisfying
creditors during bankruptcy proceedings — the BFG’s claims are settled directly after the costs of bankruptcy
proceedings and the remuneration for the bank’s employees’ work are settled (Art. 30 of the Act on the BFG, Art. 440,
para. 2 of the Bankruptcy and Recovery Act).
21 The voluntary DIS in Germany is complementary to the compulsory scheme operating in this country. Where a bank declares
bankruptcy, compensation is first paid by the compulsory scheme, while unsatisfied claims are covered by the voluntary one.
Where banks participate in both German schemes at the same time, the level of coverage is practically unlimited.3
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Figure 3
Payout limits in EU countries (thousand euro)
Source: own research. In the case of Germany, only the level of coverage offered by the mandatory DIS has been accounted for.
Pursuant to legal regulations in force, differences between the levels of coverage offered may
be used as an instrument of competition between banking sectors in individual European Union
countries. Pursuant to the home country control principle, foreign branches of a bank registered in
an EU member state operating in another EU country are covered by guarantees under the DIS
implemented in the home country. Although Directive 94/19/EC includes the export prohibition
clause22, it only remained in force until December 31, 1999. It is currently accepted that foreign
branches of Italian or French banks operating in EU countries with lower level of coverage offer
depositors better guarantees than local banks.
While comparing the level of coverage currently in force, one should not only look at face
values. In order to assess the real level of guarantees offered to depositors, the level of coverage
should be viewed against the background of the parameters of a given economy. Such parameters
may include the average deposit amount, national product per capita or the average annual
disposable income in a given economy. The figure below presents the ratio of payout limits to GDP
per capita (2003 figures) calculated for individual European Union countries.
Although the face value of the level of coverage offered by the BFG is not very high, in real
terms (compared to GDP per capita) it is one of the highest among European Union countries
(Figure 4). Only the Italian DIS is more generous in real terms; the face value of its payouts is over
five times higher than in Poland. The Polish ratio of payout limit to GDP per capita is 4.2 and
significantly exceeds the unweighted average for EU countries, which is 1.9, and the corresponding
worldwide ratio, which stands at 2.423.
These data indicate that the level of coverage offered by the BFG is relatively high. Such a
situation may cause a relaxation in market discipline and increase the probability of moral hazard;
IMF research indicates that the level of coverage ranging from one to two times the GDP per capita




















































































































































































































22 The clause concerned both the level and scope of coverage offered.
23 See: Garcia (2000).
24 See: Garcia (2000).18
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should actively seek to prevent any increase in the minimum coverage amount harmonised by the
regulations of Directive 94/19/EC in the immediate future.
Pursuant to the regulations of Directive 94/19/EC, DISs in Member States may make the
depositor partially liable for its deposit. The co-insurance must not exceed 10%, however. In
practice, over a half (13)EU countries have taken advantage of this. It should be noted that the
depositor’s joint liability has been introduced relatively more often (in 80% of the cases) in the DISs
of new European Union Member States.
In practice, co-insurance in EU countries involves:
covering 90% of deposit amount – in Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta, Germany and Slovakia;
covering deposits in full up to a relatively small amount and partial (90%) guarantees for the
remaining part – apart from Poland, this solution has been adopted by Lithuania, Hungary and
Great Britain. 
The adoption of this arrangement in the Polish DIS should be assessed positively – by
distributing the risk between the depositor and the scheme, co-insurance strengthens market
discipline as well as creates incentives to monitor the economic and financial standing of the bank,
and consequently reduces the probability of moral hazard.
3.3. Deposits covered by the scheme
The scope of deposits covered is another important element of a DIS. The BFG scheme covers
funds deposited by residents and non-residents in bank accounts registered under their names.
Claims resulting from other bank operations, which are substantiated by documents made out by
the bank in the owner’s name (e.g. certificates of deposit, savings bonds), are also covered by
guarantees. Joint accounts are also covered by the scheme – in such cases, the value of
compensation is calculated for each account co-holder separately. It should be remembered that
the bank’s liabilities to a given depositor are summed up and then offset against their liabilities to
the bank.
Figure 4
Ratio of payout limits to GDP per capita in EU countries
Source: own research; GDP per capita figures from Eurostat web pages; figures for Spain, Great Britain and Italy are estimates.
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In general, the BFG scheme covers zloty and foreign currency deposits registered under their
owners’ names, deposited by: 
• natural persons;
• juridical persons;
• non-corporate organisational units provided they have legal capacity (e.g. partnerships,
establishments within multi-establishment enterprises, company branches and
representative offices, branches of state juridical persons, municipal units and various
informal organisations pursuing specific objectives);
• school savings programmes and employee savings-and-loan associations.
On the other hand, the BFG scheme does not cover deposits from undertakings which, in the
legislators’ view, are able to professionally assess the economic and financial standing of a bank,
such as:
• organisational units of the Treasury;
•  financial intermediaries such as: banks, brokerage houses, pension funds, investment
funds, National Investment Funds and undertakings providing insurance services;
• undertakings which are not permitted to draw up abridged balance sheets and profit and
loss accounts, i.e. “large” non-financial institutions;
• the bank’s management and its major shareholders (holding at least 5% of the bank’s
shares).
Funds which are not covered by the BFG scheme include as well:
• securities other than for money claims (e.g. options); 
• mortgage bonds;
•  funds with regard to which an absolute and final court decision has been passed
pronouncing them to originate from money laundering crimes.
The definition of covered deposits (although not entirely precise)25, and the list of excluded
funds and depositors adopted in the Polish scheme conform to the requirements of Directive
94/19/EC. Due to the need to limit the costs of the scheme and also in order to minimise moral
hazard, the directive stipulates that certain categories of deposits must be excluded from
guarantees. The following must not be covered by any scheme:
• deposits made by other credit institutions on their own behalf or for their own account,
i.e. interbank deposits;
• all instruments which would fall within the definition of own funds (e.g. bonds included in
own funds);
• deposits arising out of money laundering transactions.
Apart from deposits which must be excluded from coverage, the directive indicates types of
deposits which a given member state may exclude from coverage at its discretion. The list of such
deposits, included in Annex I to the directive, includes the following deposits:
• by financial institutions;
• by insurance undertakings;
• by government and central administrative authorities;
• by provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities;
• by collective investment undertakings;
25 E.g. with regard to the coverage by the BFG scheme of bonds issued by banks.20
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• by pension and retirement funds;
• by management and large shareholders of the bank and their relatives;
• by other companies in the same group;
• non-nominative deposits;
• yielding excessive benefits where they contributed to aggravation of the bank’s financial
situation;
• in currencies other than the euro or Member States’ currencies;
• by large enterprises.
In practice, particular EU Member States took advantage of the optional exclusions listed
above to varying extents. In the overwhelming majority of countries (around 90% of schemes),
deposits made by financial institutions have been excluded from coverage. On the other hand,
deposits in currencies other than the euro or Member States’ currencies are excluded relatively rarely
(around 30% of cases). 
While exclusions with regard to covered deposits employed in various schemes are compared,
the schemes may be divided into:
• liberal ones, which offer relatively broad coverage (few exclusions) – these are mostly
Scandinavian schemes (Sweden26, Finland and Denmark27);
• restrictive ones, where a relatively large number of deposit categories have been excluded
from coverage (Austria, France and Malta).
The scope of coverage offered by the Polish DIS appears moderate compared to the
arrangements adopted in other EU countries. Therefore, the BFG is neither very liberal nor restrictive
in this respect. Such a solution should be assessed as positive as it aims for the golden mean
between the liberal model, which gives better protection to depositors, and the restrictive one,
which usually places a greater burden on its members and makes the DIS more prone to moral
hazard.
3.4. BFG guarantee activities
As their name suggests, the basic function of all DISs are guarantee activities. This function
consists in paying out compensation, i.e. guaranteed amounts, where a bankruptcy is declared in
the banking sector. 
Where bank’s assets are insufficient to cover its liabilities, the Commission for Banking
Supervision decides to suspend the bank’s operations. The CBS motions the court with the
jurisdiction over the seat of the bank to declare the suspended bank bankrupt. The court should
consider the motion within one month. Where bankruptcy is declared, the court appoints a trustee
and a judge-commissioner. The trustee takes over, administers and liquidates the estate of the
bankrupt bank. The judge-commissioner directs bankruptcy proceedings and supervises the
trustee’s activities.
Within 30 days of the date on which the bank has been declared bankrupt, the trustee
determines in accordance with the bank’s books and submits to the BFG, among other things, the
list of depositors together with the information on guaranteed amounts due to each depositor
and the amount of the bank’s liquid funds included in the bankruptcy estate. Having approved the
list of depositors, the Fund Management Board passes a resolution regarding the payment of
guaranteed amounts. Subsequently the trustee, having received appropriate funds from the BFG,
26 Although the number of discretionary exclusions indicated in Directive 94/19/EC is relatively low in the Swedish
scheme, it only covers short-term deposits, contrary to the regulations of the directive.
27 The Danish fund even covers funds held in pension accounts. 3
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makes payouts to the depositors of the failed bank. Payouts are made according to the timetable
approved by the BFG Management Board but not later than 3 months after the funds become
unavailable28. Where unfavourable circumstances occur, the court may grant two 3-month
extensions of the payout period at the request of the Fund Management Board, i.e. the entire
payout procedure may not exceed 9 months. Compensations are paid out by the receiver or trustee
in locations and on dates which have been made publicly known. Subsequently, during 5 years from
the date on which the bank was declared bankrupt, the compensations due are paid out by the
BFG. It should be noted that claims related to guaranteed amounts expire 5 years after the date on
which the bank was declared bankrupt. 
The scope of Bank Guarantee Fund guarantee activities is presented in Table 3.
During the operation of the BFG, i.e. since April 1995, 94 banks have gone bankrupt,
including 5 commercial banks and 89 cooperative ones. The number of pay-outs makes the BFG
the most experienced guarantee institution operating in an EU country29. The overwhelming
majority of failures happened during the first two years of the Fund’s operation. The most serious
bank failure (in terms of the number of entitled depositors and the amount of compensation paid)
occurred in 2000, however. The bankruptcy of a medium-sized commercial bank (Bank Staropolski
SA) was declared at that time. From 1995 to 2004, the BFG paid out a total of 811.1m zloty in
guaranteed deposits to the depositors of bankrupt banks. Compensation was paid out to 317,400
entitled depositors.
28 Funds are unavailable where the covered deposits are due but cannot be withdrawn from the date on which the
bank’s operations have been suspended.
29 Based on the results of a survey conducted by the Italian guarantee fund presented during the European Forum of
Deposit Insurers seminar in Padua on November 8–9, 2004.
Table 3 
BFG guarantee activities during the years 1995-2004
Source: Annual Report of the BFG, 2003.
* 50 banks went bankrupt in 1995 during the period when the Law on the BFG was in force; 60 banks failed during the entire year.
YEAR
1995* 50 103.7 88.7
1996 31 50.8 59.4
1997 6 6.4 10.4
1998 4 8.2 6.8
1999 1 4.7 1.6
2000 1 625.1 147.7
2001 1 12.2 2.5
2002 0 0.5 0.3
2003 0 0.1 0.0
2004 0 0.0 0.0
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The DISs operating in various countries exhibit significant differences with regard to their
powers and the types of activities undertaken. In accordance with the international terminology,
such schemes may be divided into two categories:
• p pa ay yb bo ox x    – their powers are limited to paying out guaranteed deposits where a credit
institution declares bankruptcy;
• r ri is sk k    m mi in ni im mi is se er r    – such institutions have wide-ranging powers including the option of
extending financial support to prevent a bank from failure. It should be noted here that
there are significant differences between individual schemes with regard to the assistance
instruments employed. 
According to the classification above, the BFG comes within the risk minimiser category.
Apart from its guarantee-related function, the Polish fund is equipped with powers to financially
support the rehabilitation of banks which are threatened with insolvency. Moreover, the BFG is
authorised to conduct audits at banks under rehabilitation and extend loans in order to support
merger processes at cooperative banks which are not threatened with insolvency. 
The capacity to undertake any activities apart from guarantee-related ones (including e.g.
rehabilitation operations to prevent bank failure) has not been regulated in any way by Directive
94/19/EC. As a result, DISs operating in European Union countries exhibit significant differences
with regard to their admissible scopes of activity (Figure 5). Most (16 out of 25) operate as a
paybox, and are only authorised to pay compensation to depositors after a bank’s bankruptcy has
been declared. The remaining 9 guarantee funds have been granted powers to conduct assistance
activities aimed at preventing bankruptcies in the banking sector. Apart from the BFG, wide-ranging
prerogatives have been granted to the Austrian, Danish, French, Spanish, Lithuanian, German,
Hungarian and Italian funds.
Figure 5
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The assistance activities conducted by the Bank Guarantee Fund30 consist in extending
repayable financial support to banks where a threat of insolvency emerges. The BFG assesses the
threat of the bank’s insolvency upon an analysis of its economic and financial standing, on
considering both the scale and the causes of the bank’s financial difficulties. Insolvency is deemed
a threat where the capital adequacy ratio falls below supervisory requirements and balance sheet
loss has been recorded at the bank.
The list of available forms of assistance offered by the BFG is a closed one and includes
extension of a loan, endorsement or guarantee and acquisition of debts of the banks, except for
irregular ones30. 
The circumstances in which the Bank Guarantee Fund may extend repayable financial support
are specifically stipulated in legal regulations. The aid granted by the BFG may only be allocated
to the following purposes:
• elimination the danger of insolvency (the so-called self-rehabilitation of the bank);
• acquisition of a bank or part thereof or a merger between banks if the bank being acquired
is threatened with insolvency;
• purchase of shares in a bank, which is threatened with insolvency, by new shareholders.
Fundamental principles underlying the assistance activities undertaken by the BFG include: 
• equal access to assistance funds for all banks;
• transparent criteria and procedures for granting assistance;
• making funds available to banks at the earliest possible stage in order to minimize losses;
• supporting merger processes by extending assistance to the bank which acquires a bank
threatened with insolvency;
• involving bank owners in financial support for the rehabilitation process;
• creating incentives for banks to seek additional financing sources apart from the BFG;
• granting assistance solely at the request of the interested bank, on the basis of a formal
application submitted to the BFG;
• financial support granted by the BFG may only be used to remove the threat of the bank’s
insolvency;
• in order for financial support to be granted, a bank must provide collateral.
The Bank Guarantee Fund extends repayable financial support to banks on more-favourable-
than-market terms. Therefore the Fund may extend loans with lower interest rates, charge lower
fees on guarantees and endorsements extended and set time limits for debt repayment which are
favourable for banks. Since June 2002, the annual interest on loans extended by the BFG has
ranged from 0.1 to 0.4 of the NBP rediscount rate. It should be noted that in the case of
delinquency in the payment of principal or interest, statutory interest is accrued. The fee for
commercial banks has been set at 0.3% and for cooperative banks at 0.1% of the loan amount.
The fee on endorsements and guarantees extended is 0.5% of the endorsement or guarantee
amount. The period during which the borrower avails of loans should not exceed 5 years in
principle, but it may be extended to 10 years in exceptional circumstances. In duly founded cases,
the Fund Management Board may decide to grant a grace period for the repayment of loan
principal. 
30 Detailed regulations regarding the assistance activities of the BFG are included in Resolution No. 35/97 of the BFG
Council on the stipulation of principles, forms, conditions and procedure of extending financial support to undertakings
covered by the mandatory scheme of November 20, 1997.
31 Detailed regulations are included in the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on BFG’s trade in claims purchased
from banks where a threat of insolvency has emerged of September 22, 1999.24
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However, the BFG requires the beneficiary bank to meet a number of conditions when
granting financial support. The most important requirements include:
• submitting the results of the audit of the bank’s financial statement to the Fund;
•  obtaining the approval of the Commission for Banking Supervision concerning the
rehabilitation proceedings programme (or the advisability of an acquisition or merger, as
applicable);
• demonstrating that the amount of financial support applied for is not higher than the
amount of covered deposits held by the bank (the least-cost resolution principle);
• utilising the bank’s existing regulatory capital to cover losses.
As evidenced by Table 4, during its period of operation the BFG extended financial support
to banks totalling 3,264.3m zloty. By the end of 2004, 97 loans in total were granted, of which 43
amounting to 2,980.4m zloty to commercial banks and 54 amounting to 283.9m zloty to
cooperative banks. This amount was allocated to:
• self-rehabilitation of cooperative and commercial banks (2,249.0m zloty);
• consolidation activities of cooperative banks (100.8m zloty);
• acquisitions conducted by commercial banks (914.4m zloty).
The assistance activities of the BFG directly contributed to limiting the scale of bank failures.
As a result of such activities, deposits amounting to much more than the total amount of loans
were salvaged (Table 5). Had all the banks which used the BFG’s financial support declared
bankruptcy, compensation to depositors totalling 62,090.9m zloty would have had to be paid.
Another 21,143.7m zloty would have been lost by entities whose deposits were (partially or fully)
excluded from the BFG coverage. 
Moreover, the assistance activities of the BFG from 1995 to 2004 contributed to preserving
1,927 bank field branches and 63,940 jobs. The Fund’s financial support also translated to ensuring
continued access to banking services as well as an improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness
of the banks’ operations.
Apart from guarantee and assistance activities, other areas of activity of the Bank Guarantee
Fund should be mentioned. In 2000, the Polish fund gained new powers32 to extend loans in order
to support merger processes at cooperative banks which are not threatened with insolvency.
32 Pursuant to the Act on the Operations of Cooperative Banks, their Affiliation and Affiliating Banks of December 7, 2000.
Table 4 
BFG assistance activities during the years 1995-2004
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These loans are primarily aimed at financing investments consisting in the uniformisation of
computer software and hardware, banking technologies, financial and accounting procedures and
the range of banking products and services on offer as well as the purchase of shares in the
affiliating bank. The loan term is 3 years and the interest rate is equal to 0.1 of the NBP rediscount
rate, while the fee is 0.1% of the loan amount. The total amount of such support extended by the
BFG from 2001 to 2004 was 176.1m zloty, of which 170.3m zloty was allocated to financing
mergers and investment and 5.8m zloty to the purchase of affiliating bank shares.
The powers of the Bank Guarantee Fund include conducting audits (also direct ones) at the
banks which use the Fund’s financial support. The BFG verifies whether the loans extended to banks
are properly (expediently and efficiently) utilised and whether the rehabilitation, merger or
restructuring programmes are properly implemented. Audits conducted by the BFG concern:
• proper loan utilisation;
• the progress made with regard to the loan utilisation plan and the rehabilitation programme;
• the bank’s economic and financial standing;
• the fulfilment of additional conditions stipulated in the loan agreement.
Where frequent and thorough audits fail to yield desirable results, the Bank Guarantee Fund
may be appointed conservator by a decision of the Commission for Banking Supervision. The
conservator exercises constant control over the bank’s operations and the implementation of the
rehabilitation programme. The BFG Management Board appoints attorneys who assume the
conservator’s responsibilities. The conservator’s attorney attends the meetings of the Management
Board and the Supervisory Board of the bank and has access to all documents related to the bank’s
operations. The conservator’s most important prerogative is the right to challenge the decisions of
the bank’s authorities in court if in their view such decisions jeopardise the achievement of the
objectives set out in the rehabilitation programme.
Another area of the Fund activity is monitoring the overall condition of the banking sector
and of individual banks. The monitoring conducted by the BFG aims to identify threatened banks
or banks whose financial situation is deteriorating33. The BFG also monitors the condition of the
banks using its assistance34.
The comparison of the number and scale of interventions of the Polish Fund regarding its
various activity areas from 1995 to 2004 reveals certain evolution in the BFG task hierarchy. Over
33 More on this subject in: Konat and Sowiƒska (2002) and Ocena sytuacji finansowej sektora bankowego w 2003 roku
(na podstawie danych audytowanych) w Êwietle analizy BFG (2004).
34 More on this subject in: Zborowska (2004).
Table 5
Effects of BFG assistance operations over the years 1996-2004 (m zloty)
Source: Annual report of the BFG, 2003. It should be taken into account that in 2001 assistance was granted to PKO BP SA, which
significantly distorts comparisons between amounts of loans extended and amounts of guaranteed deposits.
YEAR
1996 129.2 162.3 282.3
1997 343.7 1 297.2 828.2
1998 219.1 8 228.8 2 783.5
1999 284.1 1 343.8 1 399.9
2000 205.3 305.1 265.3
2001 749.0 49 275.8 11 170.8
2002 132.8 166.7 62.2
2003 751.0 752.1 121.5
2004 450.0 559.1 4 230.0
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years of the BFG’s operations, the focus gradually shifted from the guarantee function to assistance
activities. While in the first two years of the Fund’s operation pay-outs dominated, since 1997 the
number of assistance interventions has exceeded the number of pay-outs.
The experience of other countries shows that wider-ranging powers of the DIS, and in
particular the capacity of extending assistance to threatened banks, usually translate to lower
operating expenses of a given scheme in the long run. It should be noted, however, that this
relationship only holds when a DIS is obliged to choose the least costly method, also taking the
bank’s bankruptcy and the pay-out into consideration. Canadian experience shows that due to the
extension of powers of the Canadian fund (which took place in 1987), the operating expenses of
the DIS were reduced from around 52 cents to around 17 cents per every dollar in premiums35.
The 10-year experience of the Bank Guarantee Fund allows a favourable assessment of the
assistance activities of the Fund. These interventions, based on the formula described above, largely
contributed to stabilising the banking sector and actively supporting structural reforms within it. It
should be noted, however, that the system in its present form, which is based on extending low
interest loans to banks, has steadily become less efficient. Banks invest the loans obtained from the
BFG in Treasury securities and the spread between the interest on such securities and the interest
on the loan granted is their real income from the support extended. The efficiency of such loans
has declined due to a significant decrease in the yield of these securities. Therefore achieving a
comparable income in present circumstances would require a sharp increase in the amount of loan
granted by the BFG36. 
There is a general consensus that the list of assistance instruments available to the BFG
must be extended. Much hope is attached to the Fund being able to purchase a majority stake in
the bank threatened with insolvency. Thus the BFG would become (for a limited period) the
strategic investor whose aim would be to restructure the bank and then sell the shares it holds on
market terms. The possibility of the Fund extending subordinated loans is also considered. The
extension of the BFG’s scope of activity may also consist in entrusting it with the additional
responsibility of liquidating the banks which cannot be rehabilitated.
The experience of other countries also indicates that the powers of the BFG, and particularly
the list of assistance instruments available, should be extended. Most European DISs operating as
a risk minimiser enjoy wider powers than the BFG with regard to extending assistance to banks
threatened with insolvency. In 2 countries (Italy and France) the list of available instruments is open-
ended – it is assumed that the authorities of the guarantee institution are responsible for selecting
the specific form of assistance37. However, regardless of the manner in which the list of assistance
forms is specified (a closed list or the principle of arbitrary choice), the fund’s authorities are obliged
to choose a specific method according to the least-cost resolution principle, just as in Poland38.
The scope of powers of a given DIS obviously influences the number of persons employed
by the guarantee institution. There is wide variation between DISs in this regard – the Swedish
paybox scheme normally employs 2 persons, while the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, which
acts as a risk minimiser, has around 800 employees. The Bank Guarantee Fund employs 91 persons.
This is a relatively large number compared to guarantee institutions in European Union countries –
even those with wide-ranging powers. The BFG’s large payroll partly results from the scale of
interventions undertaken by the Fund, which in turn stems from the number and standing of
individual banks. 
35 See: Sabourin (2003).
36 See: Baka (2004a).
37 More information on the most frequently employed forms of assistance for problem banks in: Pawlikowski (2004).
38 See: Obal and Polijaniuk (2003).5
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5.1. General BFG financial management principles
The mode of financing is a very important aspect of every DIS. In each case, however, the
scheme should be financed in a way that ensures its smooth operation. Financing encompasses five
fundamental issues:
• providing the initial capital of the DIS;
• the entities financing the scheme (under normal and contingency conditions);
• the time when funds are accumulated;
• types and structure of contributions;
• regulations concerning the fund’s investments.
The financial management of the Bank Guarantee Fund is based on the annual financial
plan drawn up by the Fund Management Board and approved by the Fund Council by the end of
the financial year preceding the year which it concerns. The financial plan includes, among other
things, information on the planned amounts of individual funds as well as the planned earnings
and assets of the BFG. Moreover, the Fund Management Board draws up the report on the Fund’s
activities and the financial statement for the previous financial year by March 31 of each year,
which is first accepted by the BFG Council and then approved by the Council of Ministers.
According to financial management principles, the BFG establishes the following funds39:
• statutory fund – established in order to ensure money for acquisition of the Fund’s
tangible fixed assets and to make compensation payouts after other sources have been
exhausted. The statutory fund was established by a joint contribution of the National Bank
of Poland and the Ministry of Finance. In 1995, these institutions paid contributions of
50m zloty each to the BFG, thus supplying its initial capital;
• assistance fund – established in order to ensure money for financing the Fund’s tasks
entailing the provision of assistance to entities covered by the scheme;
• guaranteed deposit protection fund (GDPF) – designed to finance the guarantee
activities of the BFG. It should be emphasised that this is the only fund in this group not
included in the BFG’s own funds;
• fund for restructuring of cooperative banks – used to extend loans in order to support
merger processes at cooperative banks which are not threatened with insolvency;
• reserve fund – established in order to secure funds to cover potential balance sheet losses
as well as to make pay-outs and supply the assistance fund after other financing sources
have been exhausted;
• revaluation reserve – is used to record movements in the value of fixed assets due to their
revaluation. The amount of this fund increases with each increase in the value of fixed assets.
39 Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Statute of the Bank Guarantee Fund of February 28, 1995.28
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The GDPF and the assistance fund are the most important ones for the operation of the Polish
DIS. Therefore these funds will be described in more detail later in this paper.
Moreover, the financial management principles of the Bank Guarantee Fund stipulate the
manner in which the funds held by the Fund are invested. The BFG’s funds and securities are
held at the NBP in a current account, time deposit accounts, a separate special account for
guarantee settlements, in the Central Treasury Bill Registry and the NBP Money Market Bill Registry
as well as the National Depository for Securities or a brokerage house selected by the Fund. The BFG
may only invest available funds by purchasing securities issued or fully guaranteed by the Treasury
or the NBP as well as money market fund units.
It should be mentioned that the Bank Guarantee Fund is exempt from corporate income tax.
5.2. Financing of guarantee activities
The Bank Guarantee Fund may dispose of funds accumulated by banks in the form of the
guaranteed deposit protection funds in the course of its guarantee activities. All the banks covered
by the BFG scheme are obliged to establish this fund. The GDPF is a dormant one because the BFG
only requests banks to make appropriate funds available when a bankruptcy is declared in the banking
sector. Specified amounts from the GDPF are transferred by banks to the BFG’s special account and are
the basic source from which the depositors’ claims are satisfied. Therefore, taking the time when funds
are accumulated into account, the guarantee activities of the BFG are financed in an ex post mode. 
The size of the GDPF during a given year is determined in accordance with the amount of
the bank’s funds which form the basis for calculating the amount of reserve requirements and the
percentage rate set annually by the Fund Council. The maximum GDPF rate is 0.4%. In subsequent
years, the size of GDPF is determined in accordance with the amount of funds in October of the
previous year and then adjusted in accordance with the data for April of the current year. The GDPF
is increased or decreased on July 1 of each year. Only the banks which have declared bankruptcy
are exempt from the obligation of establishing the GDPF.
Banks are required to invest the funds which constitute the GDPF in Treasury securities and
NBP money market bills as well as money market fund units only. Except for money market fund
units, these assets are held in deposit accounts (separate for each bank) with the National Bank of
Poland or the National Depository for Securities. It should be emphasised that the funds
constituting the GDPF are a source of interest income to banks and are included in their balance
sheets – therefore they are not own funds of the BFG. 
It should be noted that a bank’s bankruptcy does not always necessitate payouts from the
GDPF. Compensation for depositors is paid in the first place from the liquid assets of the failed bank
as well as assets recovered from bank bankruptcy estates of previous years. Such a situation
occurred in 1999 and 2001 where, despite failures in the banking sector, there was no need to use
GDPF funds (Table 6). If, however, the amount of compensation exceeds the amount of the funds
mentioned above, banks contribute appropriate amounts to the BFG in proportion to the amounts
of the GDPF established by each of them.
Information concerning the percentage rates, amounts and the utilisation rates of the GDPF
is presented in Table 6.
As it has already been mentioned, 94 banks have gone bankrupt during the operation of the
Bank Guarantee Fund, i.e. since April 1995. From 1995 to 2004, the Fund paid out a total of
811.7m zloty of compensations to the depositors of failed banks. Out of this amount, 626m zloty
(i.e. 77.2%) were GDPF funds, while the remaining 185m zloty (i.e. 22.8%) were liquid assets of
failed banks and funds recovered from bankruptcy estates.
In the operations of the BFG to date, the GDPF has proved sufficient to finance the
bankruptcies which occurred in the banking sector. If, however, the amount of compensation to be5
BFG Financing
MATERIA¸Y I STUDIA – PAPER 34 29
paid exceeded GDPF funds, the BFG would have to satisfy the depositors’ claims from its remaining
funds, including the statutory fund. If also those funds were to prove insufficient, the Fund could
be supplied by the following emergency financing sources:
• A loan extended pursuant to a decision of the President of the NBP in the amount not
exceeding the amount equal to one half of the Fund’s receipts from annual contributions
payable by the undertakings covered by the guarantee scheme40;
• An increase in annual contributions and the GDPF percentage rate pursuant to a decision
of the Council of Ministers, having sought the opinion of the President of the NBP, to the
maximum of 0.8%. 
Despite the potential support from the central bank, in principle the guarantee activities of
the BFG are financed by its participants, i.e. commercial banks.
5.3. Financing of assistance activities
The assistance activities of the Bank Guarantee Fund are financed in an entirely different
manner than guarantee interventions. The funds allocated to financial support extended by the BFG
are accumulated in the assistance fund. This fund, in turn, is financed by mandatory annual
contributions payable by all banks participating in the DIS. Only the banks which have declared
bankruptcy are exempt from the obligation to contribute annual contributions to the BFG.
Therefore, given the time when funds are accumulated, the assistance activities of the BFG are
financed in an ex ante mode.
The amount of the annual contribution is determined in accordance with the risk-weighted
assets of each bank and the percentage rate set annually by the BFG Council. The maximum rate
for total balance sheet assets and risk-weighted guarantees and endorsements is 0.4%, while for
other risk-weighted off-balance sheet liabilities41 it is 0.2%. The calculations are based on the
aforementioned amounts as of December 31 of the previous year. These contributions are payable
within the time limits set by the BFG but not later than by March 31 each year. The assistance fund
is managed at the BFG and each year its unused part is carried over to the next year. The assistance
40 Art. 34, para. 3 of the Law on the Bank Guarantee Fund.
41 Except for revolving credit facilities.
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Source: Annual reports of the BFG. In 1999 and 2001, all deposits covered by the BFG were paid out from assets recovered from bank
bankruptcy estates and placed no burden on the banking sector.
Year
%m   zloty %
Other banks PKO BP, Pekao SA and BG˚ SA
1995 0.40 0.20 225.7 38.0
1996 0.40 0.20 317.1 14.9
1997 0.18 0.12 198.8 2.4
1998 0.10 0.05 128.3 3.2
1999 0.16 0.08 271.6 0.0
2000 0.40 999.5 48.4
2001 0.30 873.6 0.0
2002 0.40 1 245.4 0.0
2003 0.40 1 264.3 0.0
2004 0.25 826.5 0.0
2005 0.13
GDPF percentage rate
GDPF amount GDPF utilisation rate30
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fund is additionally supplied by repayments of the loans previously extended to banks and receipts
from the sales of previously acquired debts.
Commercial banks are not the only entities which finance the assistance fund of the Bank
Guarantee Fund. From 1998 onwards, the National Bank of Poland has also contributed to the
assistance fund. In 1998, its share was 30%, and in 1999 and 2000 it grew to 40%. Since 2001,
the banks’ assistance fund payments have been reduced by 50% and the remaining amount has
been contributed by the NBP.
Three commercial banks – PKO BP, Pekao SA and BG˚ SA – were covered by Treasury
guarantees until the end of 199942. As a result, the amounts of annual contribution paid by them
to the BFG were reduced by 50% compared to the rest of the banking sector. These banks were
also granted temporary “relief” with regard to the establishing of the GDPFs.
It should be noted that the following assets are exempt from the mandatory annual
contribution:
• assets from contract credits agreements in banks keeping housing credit associations;
• assets derived from the issuance of mortgage bonds and public debentures;
• the National Housing Fund;
• the National Fund for Credit Guarantees;
• the Thermo-modernization Fund;
• the National Highway Fund;
• the Student Loans and Credits Fund;
• the assets held in the account for provisions for endorsement and guarantees kept by the
State Treasury with Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego.
Information concerning annual contributions and the amounts of the assistance fund in
subsequent years is presented in Table 7.
42 The Treasury guarantees for those banks applied to amounts exceeding the guarantees extended by the BFG, so they
were supplementary ones.
Table 7
Assistance fund during the years 1995-2005
Source: Annual reports of the BFG. 
Between 1995 and 1999, a reduced rate applied to the banks whose deposits were covered by Treasury guarantees (PKO BP, Pekao SA
and BG˚ SA). In 1995, a reduced rate also applied to cooperative banks.
From 1995 to 1997, a uniform rate of 0.4% applied to risk-weighted assets, guarantees and endorsments.




PKO BP, Pekao SA,
and BG˚ SA
1995 0.40 0.20 173.8 0.0 173.8 0.0
1996 0.40 0.20 230.0 0.0 230.0 0.0
1997 0.40 0.20 261.2 0.0 261.2 0.0
1998 0.28 0.14 209.2 89.8 299.0 3.9
1999 0.24 0.12 203.4 135.6 339.0 46.2
2000 0.23 0.23 258.5 172.4 430.9 71.4
2001 0.14 0.14 158.6 158.6 317.1 148.4
2002 0.08 0.08 95.5 95.5 191.0 280.3
2003 0.10 0.10 122.6 122.6 245.2 647.2
2004 0.075 0.075 93.1 93.1 186.2 365.6
2005 0.05 0.05
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From 1995 to 1997, the maximum annual contribution rate applied. In subsequent years, as
a result of an improvement in the banking sector condition, the rate steadily declined to reach
0.05% in 2005. The annual contribution rate was slightly increased only once, in 2003.
5.4. BFG financing compered to other EU schemes
The provisions of Directive 94/19/EC do not discuss the issues of financing national DISs in
much detail. It is stipulated that the costs of financing the scheme should in principle be borne by
its participants, i.e. the banking sector. Moreover, the European Union Member States shall
establish DISs whose financial assets are sufficient to meet potential liabilities. The latter, in turn,
depend on the size of the banking sector and the position of individual banks. On the other hand,
a certain limit must not be exceeded with regard to accumulating funds as this would pose a threat
to the banking sector. The accumulation of funds by the DIS entails commensurate costs for the
banking system. If the costs mount too high, the condition of the financial system may deteriorate
and thus its safety may be compromised43. Therefore the guidelines concerning financing
contained in the Directive are very general and leave Member States much leeway.
In practice, DISs operating in European Union countries exhibit significant differences with
regard to financing. On considering the time where funds are accumulated, DISs can be divided
into those financed:
in an ex ante mode, where the funds allocated to potential compensation payouts arising
from guarantees are accumulated beforehand, according to the plan for each financial year;
in an ex post mode, where funds are only accumulated after the conditions triggering the
guarantee have been met, i.e. after a bank has declared bankruptcy. 
A large majority (18 out of 25) of DISs operating in European Union countries are financed
in an ex ante mode (Figure 6). This means that in those countries the DIS physically holds the funds,
which can be used pursuant to the regulations applicable in a given country. Only 4 countries – the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Italy – have adopted the ex post mode, i.e. DISs do not
43 See: Obal (2004).
Figure 6 
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have significant44 funds at their disposal if there are no failures in the banking sector. In the
remaining countries, i.e. in Austria, Poland and Great Britain, the financing of the DIS exhibits both
types of features, i.e. is a mixed one. 
Therefore Polish regulations in this respect may be considered original compared to the
arrangements adopted in other European Union countries. In the case of the BFG, mixed
financing has been adopted, because guarantee activities are financed in an ex post mode and
assistance activities in an ex ante one. Based on the 10-year experience of the BFG, the adopted
method of financing should be assessed favourably. However, taking into account both the
arrangements adopted in European Union countries and worldwide trends in this regard, it appears
that the regulations concerning the BFG should evolve towards financing its activities in an ex ante
mode. Moreover, this solution would promise numerous advantages, e.g. bank payments would be
more evenly timed, it would be anti-cyclical and compensation would be paid sooner.
In some European Union countries where the DIS is financed in an ex ante mode, the safe
(target) amount of the fund has been set. This is usually considered a limit and no further charges
are collected after it is reached. The target fund amount is usually set with reference to the amount
of deposits covered by the scheme and ranges from 0.5% in Belgium to 3% in Estonia. On the other
hand, the limit within the Danish DIS has been set in absolute terms and amounts to DKK 3.2bn.
Such amounts are determined on the basis of analyses taking the long-term stability of the banking
sector into account. In the case of the financing mode changing from mixed to the ex ante one,
the adoption of the concept of the target amount of accumulated funds within the Polish DIS
appears absolutely reasonable. This would allow the BFG to build up a larger potential should more
severe disruptions occur within the banking system. The appropriate amount of this fund remains
an open issue but it appears that it should not be particularly high45. It should be kept in mind that
adopting a relatively high ceiling translates into more security for the banking sector, since the
assets of the DIS would be sufficient to cover bank bankruptcies on a larger scale. On the other
hand, this would result in increased costs for the banking sector and the permanent outflow of
funds from the sector to the DIS. 
While discussing the financing of a DIS, other original arrangements employed in the case
of the BFG, which have not been adopted by other European Union countries, should be pointed
out. Poland is the only European Union country where the operation of the DIS is co-
financed by entities other than commercial banks under normal conditions. As it has already
been mentioned, 50% of funds contributed to the BFG assistance fund are supplied by the
National Bank of Poland. It seems that this should only be a temporary arrangement since a rule
included in Directive 94/19/EC stipulates that the costs of financing the scheme must in principle
be borne by its participants, i.e. the banking sector. The supply of central bank funds also raises
doubts concerning the issue of public aid, which is generally prohibited under the European
Union legislation.
When it comes to the arrangement functioning in European Union countries, the
establishment of only one fund within a given DIS is a standard solution. This fund is then used
to finance both pay-outs and also to interventions related to assistance activities. The BFG
operates several funds used to finance various areas of its activity. On considering the European
experience, all BFG funds should be amalgamated into one consolidated fund, which would
be used to finance all tasks of the Polish DIS. This solution should be assessed as advantageous
as it would simplify the Fund’s financial management and expectedly improve efficiency of fund
management by the BFG.
Differences between DISs in European Union countries also include the structure of
contributions payable by their participants. There are differences with regard both to the base
for calculating premiums and the manner of including the risk borne by a given bank. In a vast
44 In such cases, DISs only have at their disposal the funds necessary to meet typical administrative expenses (e.g.
running an office).
45 See: Baka (2004b) and Zygierewicz (2004).5
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majority of countries, the amount of covered deposits held by a given bank is the premium
calculation base. In some schemes the contributions are calculated on total deposits, i.e. both
covered and not. A slightly different approach has been adopted in Germany and Italy, where the
amount of a bank’s liabilities is taken into account. In comparison, the BFG employs a very
original method: annual contributions are determined on risk-weighted assets and the GDPF rate
applies to the amount of the bank’s funds which form the basis for establishing the mandatory
reserve. It seems that if a single, consolidated fund is established, the most appropriate
arrangement for the BFG would be to adopt the amount of covered deposits as the basis for
determining contributions. The amount of covered deposits is the most adequate measure in
such circumstances, since it is directly related to the amount of potential compensation paid by
the BFG to the bankrupt bank’s depositors. In this way, the formula for calculating contributions
payable to the DIS would be significantly simplified and a typically supervisory measurement (risk-
weighted assets) would be abandoned.
A relatively new arrangement with regard to DISs (it was first employed in the U.S. in 1993)
is differentiating the amount of premiums payable by banks according to their risk levels.
In this way, the institutions which generate a higher risk for the scheme, i.e. those which are
more likely to be threatened with bankruptcy, bear the operating costs of the DIS to a larger
degree. The concept of risk-based premiums has not yet gained much popularity in European
Union countries — it has only been adopted in 6 schemes (Figure 7). The amount of premium
may be related to the risk level using various indicators. In practice, 4 European Union countries
— Finland, Germany, Portugal and Sweden — have adopted a relatively simple risk measure, i.e.
the capital adequacy ratio. The voluntary German scheme additionally differentiates premiums
depending on a bank’s scheme membership period. Much more complicated regulations have
been employed in the Italian and French schemes, where the risk of a given credit institution is
determined using complex multivariate algorithms. In the remaining 19 countries, including
Poland, contributions to DIS are calculated on a linear basis, and therefore do not account for
the risk borne by banks.
The adoption of risk-based premiums in the Polish scheme should also be considered due to
their numerous advantages. The fundamental advantage of risk-based premiums is that they create
Figure 7 
Accounting for risk level when calculating premiums payable to the guarantee scheme in
EU countries
Source: own research.
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incentives for banks to limit their risks and therefore reduce moral hazard. This regulation also
eliminates the cross-subsidising of the weakest banks by the strongest ones. It should, however, be
borne in mind that the idea, although praised in theory, may lead to certain difficulties in practice.
The most important problem is the selection of the method which would best reflect the risk to the
DIS generated by individual banks – no universally accepted risk assessment methodology exists.
The adoption of this concept may cause practical problems with determining premiums because
wide-ranging information is required. Moreover, a question arises: how widely should premiums be
differentiated in order to effectively limit moral hazard and not destabilise the situation of
threatened banks at the same time? It is currently difficult to provide an adequate answer to such
doubts, primarily because the experience of other countries in this regard has been relatively
modest so far46.
46 More on DIS financing in: Polijaniuk and Obal (2001a).6
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Summary
Over its 10 years of active operation the Bank Guarantee Fund has proved that, along with
the National Bank of Poland and the Commission for Banking Supervision, it is among the
most important institutions protecting the Polish financial system against destabilisation. This
is evidenced by the scale of pay-outs and assistance activities undertaken by the Fund. Though an
important safety net component, the BFG should not be seen as a panacea for all banking and
economic problems. A DIS can usually cope with a limited number of bankruptcies but it cannot
be expected to remedy a crisis of the entire banking system. Therefore comprehensive solutions
must be designed, which will encompass all parts of the safety net, including the government.
The regulations regarding the Polish DIS comply with EU requirements set out in Directive
94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes. This compliance has been achieved through the gradual
adjustment of Polish DIS regulations to the Community legislation. The directive, however, is a very
general one and leaves many issues at the discretion of Member States. An overview of DISs
operating in European Union countries indicates that the practical arrangements adopted exhibit
significant variation. There are important differences between individual countries regarding in
particular the level of coverage, the mode in which the operating costs of the DIS are financed and
the structure of contributions payable to the scheme. As a result, one cannot currently state that
there is a European DIS model.
Though Polish regulations comply with EU requirements, they must be adjusted to suit the
changing domestic conditions. The relatively low interest rates and the resulting decrease in yield
on Treasury securities have reduced the efficiency of the low interest rate loan system used to date.
Therefore there is a general consensus that the list of assistance instruments available to the BFG
must be extended, which may be reflected by amendments to the Law on the BFG.
Changes are also anticipated with regard to the Fund’s financial management. The
establishment of a single consolidated fund within the BFG, which would finance all tasks of the
Polish DIS, is currently under consideration47. This fund would be financed in an ex ante mode by
charges determined on the amount of covered deposits held by individual banks. In line with
international practice, the target amount of the fund should be set with reference to the amount
of covered deposits held by the entire banking system. Moreover, the co-financing of the BFG’s
activities by the National Bank of Poland appears untenable in the long run due to doubts
regarding the issue of public aid, which is generally prohibited in European Union legislation.
Certain changes in the operation of the BFG may also reflect indirectly the regulations of the
New Basel Capital Accord coming into force. The change in risk assessment methodology will
force the Polish scheme to adjust the method of calculating contributions payable to the scheme,
which is currently based on risk-weighted assets. Moreover, as a risk minimiser, the BFG will have
to enhance the monitoring and early warning system currently in place48.
Despite its relatively short history, the Bank Guarantee Fund boasts considerable experience
with regard not only to guarantee but also rehabilitation activities. On considering the number of
pay-outs and assistance interventions undertaken, the BFG is the most experienced DIS operating
in a European Union country. This, together with the fact that Poland is already a European Union
member, should give the Polish fund significant influence on potential future amendments to the
Community regulations regarding DISs.
47 See: Baka (2005).
48 See: Iwanicz-Drozdowska M. (2004).36
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ADMINISTRATION RESPONSIBILITIES LEVEL OF COVERAGE1
AUSTRIA 1979 private risk minimiser EUR 20,000
BELGIUM 1974 joint paybox EUR 20,000
CYPRUS 2000 joint paybox EUR 22,222
CZECH REPUBLIC 1994 joint paybox EUR 27,777
DENMARK 1987 joint risk minimiser
DKK 300,000
(ca. EUR 40,300)
ESTONIA 1998 joint paybox
EEK 111,111
(ca. EUR 7,111)
FINLAND 1970 private paybox EUR 25,000








1966 private risk minimiser 30% of the bank’s own capital
GREAT BRITAIN 1979 public paybox
GBP 35,000
(ca. EUR 50,900)
GREECE 1995 joint paybox EUR 20,000
HUNGARY 1993 joint risk minimiser
HUF 6m
(ca. EUR 24,200)
IRELAND 1989 public paybox EUR 23,000
ITALY 1987 private risk minimiser ca. EUR 103,000
LATVIA 1998 public paybox
LVL 6,000
(ca. EUR 10,400)
LITHUANIA 1996 public risk minimiser
LTL 50,000
(ca. EUR 14,500)
LUXEMBOURG 1989 private paybox EUR 22,222
MALTA 2003 joint paybox EUR 20,000
NETHERLANDS 1978 public paybox EUR 20,000
POLAND 1995 joint risk minimiser EUR 22,500
PORTUGAL 1992 public paybox EUR 25,000
SLOVAKIA 1996 joint paybox EUR 20,000
SLOVENIA 2001 public paybox SIT 5.1m
(ca. EUR 21,250)
SPAIN 1977 joint risk minimiser EUR 20,000














risk min. – 9 –
1 Covered deposit amount.
2 Maximum amount of compensation paid.
3 Two subsystems administrated privately and one publicly.7
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90% for deposits other
than from individual
entities




Only in EEA countries’
currencies ex ante NO
90% EUR 20,000 NO ex ante NO








YES ex ante NO
– EUR 25,000  YES ex ante YES




Only in EEA countries’
currencies ex ante NO
– 30% of the bank’s own
capital
YES ex ante YES
90% for amounts over
GBP 2,000
GBP 31,700
(ca. EUR 46,100) YES mixed NO
– EUR 20,000 YES ex ante NO




Only in EU and OECD
countries’ currencies ex ante
NO4
90% EUR 20,700 YES ex ante NO




YES ex ante NO




Only in EU countries’
currencies and USD
ex ante NO
90% EUR 20,000 YES ex post NO
90% EUR 18,000  NO ex ante NO
– EUR 20,000 YES ex post NO
90% for amounts over
EUR 1,000 EUR 20,350 YES
mixed5 NO6
– EUR 25,000 YES ex ante YES
90% EUR 18,000  YES ex ante NO
– SIT 5.1m
(ca. EUR 21,250) YES ex post NO
– EUR 20,000 YES ex ante NO
–
SEK 250,000
(ca. EUR 27,750) YES ex ante YES
co-insurance – 13
none – 13 –
YES – 19
Some currencies only – 5
NO – 2
ex post – 4




4 The rate is increased, however, if the capital adequacy ratio of a given bank falls below a certain minimum.
5 Pay-outs (GDPF) are financed in an ex post mode, while assistance activities in an ex ante one.
6 Charges account for risk level to a small extent — annual contributions payable by banks depend on risk-weighted assets.38
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Glossary of deposit insurance scheme concepts
Adverse selection – the tendency of higher-risk banks to opt for deposit insurance and lower-risk
banks to opt-out of deposit insurance when a DIS is voluntary.
Bank run – a massive withdrawal of deposits caused by public fear that a bank may fail and
depositors may suffer losses.
Blanket guarantee – a government’s declaration that all deposits are covered by guarantees.
Bridge bank – an entity created in place of a problem bank under liquidation, which takes over its
selected assets and liabilities and continues banking operations during the transition period –
before acquisition or sale.
Co-insurance – incomplete protection, a situation where a DIS only pays out a pre-specified portion
of the covered deposit (e.g. 90%) and the depositor bears the risk of loss of the remaining part of
the deposit.
Ex ante financing – a mode of DIS financing where premiums are accumulated beforehand,
according to the plan for each financial year.
Ex post financing – a mode of DIS financing where contributions are payable only after the
conditions triggering the guarantee are met, i.e. a bank declares bankruptcy.
Explicit system – a formalised DIS with predetermined procedures, usually organised as a
guarantee institution.
Financial safety net – a set of institutional arrangements and regulations whose aim is to prevent
the financial system from destabilisation.
Financial stability – a state in which the financial system performs its fundamental functions
properly, i.e.: (1) ensures an efficient flow of funds between participants – from those who have
surpluses (savers) to those who borrow funds in order to invest or consume; (2) ensures the correct
valuation of assets, i.e. no sudden changes in asset prices or changes are predictable; (3) ensures
safe and efficient payments.
Implicit system – the absence of a formalised DIS with the implicit assumption that when a
systemic threat emerges, public institutions will take provisional action.
Information asymmetry – a situation where market participants do not have equal access to
information and as a result, some of them may make less than optimum decisions.
Least-cost resolution – a procedure that requires the deposit insurer to implement resolution
alternative that is determined to be less costly to the system than all other resolution alternatives,
including the liquidation of the failed bank.
Lender of last resort (LoLR) – a function which is nowadays also referred to as Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA) – providing liquidity supply to a single bank or the entire banking system in
response to an unfavourable shock leading to an extraordinary increase in demand for reserve
money, which cannot be met by other (e.g. private) sources. Acting as lender of last resort is one
of the most fundamental and oldest functions of central banks.
Market discipline – a situation where depositors or creditors assess the bank’s economic and
financial standing and respond to it by making deposits or withdrawing funds from a bank.8
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Moral hazard – a relaxation in market discipline resulting in players taking excessive risk in order to
maximise profits, based on the conviction that the potential detrimental effects of such actions will
be mitigated by financial assistance from public institutions.
Offsetting – a reduction in the amount of compensation paid to the depositor by the amount of
their liabilities to the failed bank.
Open-bank assistance – a resolution method whereby the threatened bank is supported by a direct
loan, an assisted merger or a purchase of assets.
Paybox – a guarantee institution whose activities are limited to paying out covered deposits where
a credit institution declares bankruptcy.
Purchase & assumption – an acquisition by a healthy bank or a group of investors of some or all
the obligations and some or all assets of a threatened bank.
Risk minimiser – a guarantee institution which, apart from guarantee activities (paybox), may
undertake assistance activities aimed at preventing bank failures.
Risk-based premiums – premiums payable by banks to the DIS calculated by taking the level of risk
borne by individual banks into account.
Systemic risk – the possibility that a crisis at one financial institution may spread to other market
participants, resulting in a severe disruption of the operation of the entire financial system.40
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Deposit guarantee institutions in EU countries
COUNTRY DEPOSIT GUARANTEE INSTITUTION WEB PAGE
AUSTRIA
Deposit Protection Company of the Austrian Commercial Banks
(Einlagensicherung der Banken und Bankiers Gesellschaft mbH) www.einlagensicherung.at
Hypo-Haftungesellschaft mbH www.hypoverband.at
Österreiche Raiffeisen-Einlagensicherung reg Gen.m.b.H www.rzb.at 
Sparkassen-Haftungs Aktiengesellschaft www.sparkasse.at
BELGIUM
Protection Fund for Deposits and Financial Instruments
(Le Fonds de protection des dépôts et des instruments ﬁ  nanciers)
www.protectionfund.be
CYPRUS





Deposit Insurance Fund of the Czech Republic
(Fond poji_t_ní vklad_ )
www.fpv.cz
DENMARK
The Guarantee Fund for Depositors and Investors















(Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts) www.garantiedesdepots.fr
GERMANY
Association of German Public Sector Banks




(Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V. Einlagensicherungsfonds)
www.bdb.de 
Federal Association of German Cooperative Banks
(Sicherungseinrichtung des Bundesverbandes der Deutschen
Volks-banken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V.)
–
German Saving Banks Association
(Deutscher Sparkassen und Giro Verband Sicherungseinrichtung) www.dsgv.de
Investor Protection of Public Banks
(Entschädigungseinrichtung des Bundesverbandes Öffentlicher 
Banken e.V.)
www.voeb.de
The German Private Commercial Banks Compensation Sche-
me for 
Depositors and Investors




Financial Services Compensation Scheme www.fscs.org.uk
GREECE Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund www.hdgf.gr
HUNGARY
National Deposit Insurance Fund of Hungary
(Országos Betétbiztosítási Alap) www.oba.hu
IRELAND
Deposit Protection Scheme






Interbank Deposit Protection Fund
(Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi)
www.ﬁ  td.it
Deposit Protection fund for Co-operative Banks
(Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo)
www.confcooperative.it
LATVIA
Financial and Capital Market Commission




Deposits and Investment Insurance
(Indeliu ir Investiciju Draudimas) www.tdd.lt
LUXEMBOURG
Deposit Guarantee Association
(Association pour la Garantie des Dèpòts Luxembourg)
www.agdl.lu9
Deposit guarantee institutions in EU countries





























Deposit Guarantee Fund for Banking Institutions
(Fondos de Garantía de Depósitos en Entidades de Crédito)
www.fgd.es
Deposit Guarantee Fund for Credit Cooperative Banks
(Fondos de Garantía de Depósitos en Cooperativas de Crédito)
Deposit Guarantee Fund for Saving Banks
(Fondos de Garantía de Depósitos en Cajas de Ahorro)
SWEDEN
Swedish Deposit Guarantee Board
(Insättningsgarantinämnden)
www.ign.se
EUROPEAN FORUM OF DEPOSIT INSURERS www.efdi.net
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEPOSIT INSURERS www.iadi.org42
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